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This paper seeks an explanation for the large differences in the extent and severity of poverty published 
respectively in van der Berg et al (2005: 2007a) and Meth (2006b).  Headcounts in 2004 suggested by 
van der Berg et al (2007a) exceed by five million, those reported by (Meth, 2006b). 
 
Household survey respondents often under-report income (and expenditure).  To address this, it is 
common (if not necessarily wise) to scale household survey income means until the grossed-up survey 
income totals are approximately the same as those yielded by the national accounts.  The apparent 
reason for the differences between our respective poverty estimates lies in the poor quality of the income 
estimates in the surveys used by van der Berg et al as primary data source for estimating income 
distributions (by race).  Scaling these survey estimates to make them consistent with the national 
accounts, it is argued, causes them to under-estimate the extent and severity of the poverty problem. 
 
As part of their analysis of changes in the welfare of Africans in South Africa since the advent of 
democracy (and in support of their claim that poverty has fallen), van der Berg et al attempt to measure 
changes in the racial shares of remuneration.  The present paper ends with a brief examination of some 
of the problems of doing so using Statistics South Africa household surveys (the Labour Force Surveys) 
as primary data source. 
 
Welcomed by government because of the apparent progress they report in the fight against poverty, the 
possible consequences for anti-poverty policy (and for the poor) of the van der Berg et al figures being 
wrong are non-trivial. 
 
                                                 
1 I am grateful to Murray Leibbrandt in the School of Economics in the University of Cape Town, who read and 
commented critically on this paper (the third in a series of papers on the topic).  From the outset, he has been 
immensely supportive of a project that has tried to extract credible poverty estimates from Statistics South Africa’s 
Labour Force and General Household Surveys.  It should go without saying, of course, that any errors in the present 
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In 2005, Professor van der Berg and his colleagues in the University of Stellenbosch published a set of 
poverty estimates which have proved to be enormously influential, not least because they posit a 
substantial reduction in the severity of poverty in the period 2000-2004 (van der Berg et al, 2005).  
Reworking the estimates has led to the publication of a set estimates that register even lower headcounts 
(van der Berg et al, 2007a).  In response to the claims made in the 2005 paper, I have written two papers 
(Meth, 2006a and 2006b), the first of which uses the expenditure estimates in the Labour Force Surveys 
(LFSs).  The second makes use of the income figures in the LFSs.  Both efforts discover higher poverty 
headcounts and lower rates of poverty reduction than those reported by van der Berg and his co-authors. 
 
In my 2006b paper, using the same poverty line as van der Berg et al (2005), I estimated that there were 
about 18 million people below the poverty line in 2004.  Of them, I argued: 
 
“… 14 million lived in workerless households (most containing working age people, but in which 
nobody had employment).  These zero-income (from employment, that is) households survived on a 
mix of social grants and/or remittances.  Among them were about 1.8 million people in households 
receiving no incomes at all in the survey reference period, subsisting, we know not how.  The 
remaining four million people below the poverty line were located in households containing about 
800 000 workers.  Although the bulk of poverty is caused by unemployment, the problem of the 
working poor still looms fairly large.” (Abstract) 
 
With a poverty line of R250 per capita per month in 2000 prices, the original paper by van der Berg et al 
that made use of the AMPS (All Media and Products Study) data, had headcounts of 16.2, 18.5 and 15.4 
million in 1993, 2000 and 2004 respectively (2005, Table 2, p.17).  In the most recent offering, 
headcounts in the same three years fall to 13.4, 16.3 and 13.1 million (2007a, Table 2, p.19).  The 
increase in the headcount between 1993 and 2000 is slightly higher, but expansion of the social grant 
system (and whatever job and real income growth there was) has roughly the same absolute impact as 
before, knocking about 3.1 million off the headcount between 2000 and 2004.  The poverty line is the 
same (p.19).  As noted below, apart from a short reference to ‘small improvements’ in the technique for 
estimating the distribution of wage income, there is no explanation for the substantial differences 
between their 2005 and 2007a headcount estimates. 
 
So, not only do they repeat the claim that poverty dropped by three million between 2000 and 2004; 
their latest estimates of the headcounts for 2000 and 2004 are now some two million lower than their 
2005 estimates.  In academic terms, of course, the fact that my estimates are higher than theirs is neither 
here nor there – my figures could equally well be wrong.  A problem arises, though, if they are not.  The 
van der Berg et al poverty findings have attracted a huge amount of attention (and publicity) – 
government has made frequent use of them to show that anti-poverty policies are succeeding, they 
almost certainly form an important part of the basis for the government assertion (made on numerous 
occasions) that the goal of halving poverty by 2014 will be met.  Treasury officials have tried to dismiss 
the (previous) differences between our findings as trivial – these new lower headcounts make that stance 
even less defensible than before – the difference between our estimates of the poverty headcount in 2004 
is now almost five million! 
 
By their own admission, their latest estimates of the poverty levels are “artificially low” (van der Berg et 
al, 2007a, Abstract).  This admission marks a shift from their earlier stance, where they claimed that: 
 
“The assumptions used throughout the study are those likely to yield the lowest estimates of poverty 
reduction that the national accounts data support.  Thus our estimates are also purposely biased 




population, since this group contains the majority of the poor.  Also, despite reservations that we 
have about some spikes in the data obtained from official surveys (in particular the high levels of 
wages recorded for particularly the black population in 1995 and the low levels recorded for 2000), 
we do not adjust for these and instead use the most conservative estimates of black wages.  Thus our 
estimates probably overstate poverty compared to estimates that also adjust data to be commensurate 
with the national accounts.” (van der Berg et al, 2005, p.4, emphasis in original) 
 
Recognising, as they could hardly fail to do, the essentially arbitrary character of poverty lines, the van 
der Berg oeuvre is replete with references to the need to uncover trends, presumably in preference to a 
concentration on absolute levels per se.  They cite, for example, an argument in defence of the 
adjustment of survey means using national accounts data, which speaks of the need to select methods of 
treating data which: 
 
“… minimizes errors, especially errors in trends, because that is an important variable of interest.” 
(van der Berg et al, 2007a, p.9) 
 
As I have pointed out elsewhere (Meth, 2006a, p.2), and as they themselves recognise, talk of trends is 
somewhat misleading.  In their own words, “… social assistance is nearing the boundaries of its ability 
to alleviate poverty.” (van der Berg et al, 2005, p.3).  The South African government is firmly set against 
extension of the social grant system (the major cause of such poverty reduction as has taken place since 
2000) beyond its present limits (Meth, 2007b, pp.17ff).  Unless rapid job-creating growth among the poor 
takes place, the trend they uncover will soon be no more. 
 
In previous encounters with the van der Berg et al results, although I have hinted, in personal 
communications, in a seminar setting,
2 and in my own writings on the topic (see Meth, 2006a, pp.55-56), 
at a potentially fatal flaw at the heart of their workmanship, I have steered clear of any detailed 
engagement with their method.  The release of their latest figures, means that it is no longer advisable 
simply to treat the causes of the differences between our results as if they were no more consequential 
than a debate about how many angels could dance on the head of a pin.  Accordingly, therefore, the 
present paper attempts to get to the heart of the differences between our results. 
 
The paper commences with a quibble about the way in which van der Berg et al (2007a) attempt to 
smooth over these differences.  The central section of the paper is devoted to an exposition of that part 
of their methodology within which the problem is suspected to lie.  The investigation closes in on the 
relevant bits of the AMPS survey questionnaire for the year 2004, analysis of which suggests that it is 
the form the income question takes that explains the differences between us.  In passing, comment is 
offered on the difficulties of estimating racial mean incomes at a national level.  Since van der Berg et al 
make great play of rising African shares of remuneration, some attention is paid in the final section of 
the paper to the difficulties of creating reliable estimates of the relative magnitudes of the shares of the 
different race groups. 
 
Whistling in the dark 
 
One of the hallmarks of academic endeavour is the frequent invocation of authority – with few 
exceptions, we stand on each other’s shoulders to peer into the misty depths of social reality.  Appeals to 
authority are, however, not always legitimate.  An example of an illegitimate appeal, one made to 
                                                 
2 At a workshop held in the HSRC offices in Pretoria on 17
th February 2006, at which our respective results and 
methodologies were aired and critically evaluated by Professors Lam (my work) and Leibbrandt (that of van der Berg et 
al).  Neither of the sets of estimates on offer (I presented the results and method in Meth, 2006a) was accepted by the 




bolster their weak case, may be found on the last page of the van der Berg et al (2007a) paper.  The 
authors state that: 
 
“Critics of an earlier version of this paper now acknowledge that the broad conclusions are probably 
correct (Seekings 2006; Meth 2006).” (2007a, p.26) 
 
How Seekings would respond to this claim has yet to be ascertained.  My response is to dismiss it as 
‘spin’.  From the outset, I have acknowledged that throwing an increasing amount of money at the poor 
in the form of (i) an expansion of the child support grant system, (ii) an explosion of the number of 
disability grant recipients, and (iii) a modest but far from insignificant increase in the number of state 
old age pensions (most of which went into poor households), must have had the effect of alleviating 
poverty – see Meth, 2006b, pp.51ff, the paper to which they refer, and the earlier paper, Meth, 2006a, 
p.72, to which they do not.  The disagreement between us is not over the question of whether or not 
poverty declined, it is over the extent of the decline.  As we saw above, both the 2005 and the 2007a 
van der Berg et al papers put that decline at about 3.1 million between 2000 and 2004; I think it may 
have been about 1.2-1.5 million (Meth, 2006b, pp.37-38).  The most, therefore, that van der Berg et al 
can say about my findings in relation to their own, would read something along these lines: 
 
“One critic of an earlier version of this paper (Meth 2006) also finds that poverty has declined over 
the period 2000-2004.  The decline he reports is, however, much smaller.” 
 
As I pointed out above, attempts to dismiss the differences between our findings as trivial are not 
defensible.  Errors of the magnitude suggested by our respective findings in both the headcount and 
impact on it over time of measures intended to counter poverty, could lead to gross over-estimation of 
the effectiveness of anti-poverty policy.  Complacence in the fight against poverty could have disastrous 
consequences. 
 
On that sombre note, let us commence. 
 
The van der Berg et al method of correcting for under-reporting of income 
 
Measuring poverty at a national level is bedeviled by the fact that the necessary data are either not 
available, or become so, infrequently.  National accounts are an example of the former – they contain no 
distributional information.  Population censuses are an example of the latter – in South Africa they are 
supposed to be conducted every five years.  The last census was in 2001 – the next will not be until 
2011.  The quality of the census data leaves a great deal to be desired.  Income estimates are riddled with 
problems
3 – there are many implausible zero-incomes and significant under-reporting of income. 
 
As a consequence, researchers tend to make do with whatever household survey they can lay their hands 
on.  As everybody knows, household surveys that attempt to capture information on income and 
expenditure (not all do), are somewhat less than wholly successful in the endeavour.  When compared 
with national accounts estimates of the grossed-up totals of both, household surveys often under-report 
each, sometimes by substantial amounts.  In their work on poverty, van der Berg et al go to some 
lengths to show just how extensive under-reporting is.  Their current solution to this problem is to scale 
income means derived from the AMPS surveys, using means derived from national accounts.
4  Estimates 
of total income derived from the surveys are then (roughly?) equal to the national accounts figures.  The 
                                                 
3 See Ardington et al (2005) for an account of the ways in which some of these problems have been addressed. 
4 To their credit, their 2007a paper points out in the Abstract, the bit most likely to be read, that the method of scaling 




AMPS surveys, as will be seen below define income earners in such a loose way that those ‘earning’ 
property incomes or transfers, cannot be distinguished from those earning salaries and wages. 
 
The approach I use is different – I scale only the incomes earned (remuneration) by those the surveys say 
are employed.
5  This is done by applying a correction factor to survey income estimates until the same 
result as that sought by van der Berg et al (2005, 2007a) is achieved (equality of survey and national 
accounts total income estimates).  A possible location of the explanation of the differences in our 
respective estimates thus lies in the method used to compensate for under-reporting errors in the survey 
data we use. 
 
The review of the literature on under-reporting in van der Berg et al (2007a) provides a useful 
introduction to what the great and the good have said about the problem.  It is, however, inconclusive, 
as it must be, because as it is unable to tell us what adjustments would be appropriate in the South 
African case.  The problem van der Berg and his co-authors, begins with the selection of primary unit of 
analysis – race.  The means the authors estimate from the national accounts, and the distributions they 
extract from survey data, are done so by race.  This is not a good idea – race has its uses when deployed 
at the level of the household or the individual.  Used at a highly aggregated level (for example, the 
income of the African population group, or that of the white group) it is problematic, for reasons that 
will become clear below.
6 
 
Their goal of making income distribution estimates ‘consistent with the national accounts’ entails 
‘correcting’ survey mean income estimates to the point where the total income reported in a survey 
corresponds to the national accounts estimate for that year.
7  The method used to correct for under-
reporting is to be found in Appendix 1 of van der Berg et al (2005, p.28).  In the 2007a paper, it is 
referred to thus: 
 
“The methodology followed in this paper for scaling survey means with national accounts data is 
described more fully in Van der Berg et al. (2005).  It has remained largely the same, with the 
exception of small improvements in the technique used to estimate the distribution of wage income.  
A brief explanation of the methodology follows below.” (2007a, p.16) 
 
The ‘brief explanation’ is non-technical, so the interested reader has to refer back to the 2005 paper.  In 
the compass of a working paper one can afford, indeed, one is obliged to explain, in whatever detail is 
necessary, how one arrives at one’s conclusions.  Since the authors have laid out the method in an 
earlier paper, it is not only legitimate to refer to that exposition, it also saves the reader’s time, unless, 
that is, said reader is bent on understanding the process in detail.  A couple of gaps in the 2005 paper 
                                                 
5 Assuming that all workers are identified by the surveys, under-reporting of incomes in the LFSs and GHSs is only 
possible among those households into which ‘earned’ incomes of one sort or another flow (wages or salaries of 
household members, interest, rent or profit and migrant remittances).  If households into which social grants flow are 
correctly identified by the surveys, then income from this source cannot be under-reported – the precise values of the 
grants are known and fixed.  Neither condition holds, of course, so ways have to be found to deal with (a) implausible 
zero-income households, and (b) mis-reporting of social grant income.  Once this has been done (and the zero-income 
problem is less severe in the LFSs and the GHSs than in the other Statistics South Africa sources of which the authors 
are critical), then adjustment for under-reporting can take place. 
The LFSs and GHSs do a poor job of measuring ‘property’ income (surplus). 
6 Apart from the obvious (but not necessarily useful) political interest in the question of how the welfare of the 
different race groups has changed since 1994, the authors do furnish a rationale for their use of race as an identifying 
category.  It occurs is the context of the discussion of differential under-reporting errors.  The use of racial means for 
scaling, if scaling factors differ, implies that “both the shape of the aggregate income distribution and its mean are 
affected by the adjustment.” (van der Berg et al, 2007a, p.10). 
7 There is a discussion in van der Berg et al (2007a, p.6) of the differences between the survey and national accounts 




make it difficult, however, for readers to make an informed assessment of its merits.  We begin to get 
stuck in what feels like an infinite regress – the 2005 paper says: 
 
“Regarding methodology, this paper extends the work done in Van der Berg and Louw (2004), and as 
such largely follows the methodology employed in that study.” 
 
That paragraph (in the 2005 paper) continues thus: 
 
“We first arrive at a distribution of household income across race groups using a number of data 
sources including national accounts data series, employment data from the Standardised 
Employment Series and Labour Force Surveys, and social grant data from fiscal incidence studies.  
The mean racial per capita incomes obtained through these calculations are then applied to intra-
racial distribution data obtained from household surveys (the annual All Media and Products Survey) 
to arrive at estimates of the income distribution that maintain the household survey distribution 
information but accord with national accounts current household income magnitudes.  In other 
words, we trust national accounts data for aggregate household income, while we trust survey data 
for the distribution of such income between households.” (van der Berg et al, 2005, pp.10-11) 
 
Instead of going backwards to their 2004 paper (which used, inter alia, Bureau of Market Research data), 
we turn instead to the AMPS survey questionnaire – it is, after all, the use of the AMPS data that is the 
big innovation in the 2005 work. 
 
Like all poverty researchers, van der Berg and his colleagues have to face the fact that generally 
speaking, the surveys with which they work are not designed specifically for the measurement of 
poverty.  In this regard, the data pumped out by the AMPS surveys are no different – I have argued that 
the AMPS data are, in fact, inferior to the data available from the Statistics South Africa household 
surveys.  The validity of this claim will be demonstrated below. 
 
Before looking at the way income is treated in the AMPS survey (at least, the 2004 survey), let us glance 
at their discussion on scaling, as much to be sure of what means are being scaled, as to understand the 
scaling process. 
 
Scaling the survey mean income estimates 
 
In Appendix 1 of their 2005 paper, van der Berg et al begin the description of the process of scaling 
survey means with the expression: 
 
“Yi = Ri + Ti + Pi” 
 
where i is the ith population group, and “… Y is total current income from the national accounts and the 
three income components are Remuneration Income R, Transfer Income T, and Income from Property P.”  
The sums of the income of each type going to each of the four population groups, equals total current 
income, Y.  Our concern is with R.  Very properly, the authors set out to allow only the survey means for 
remuneration to be scaled (2005, p.28).
8  Because, however, of the poor quality of the AMPS ‘earned 
income’ figures, van der Berg and his co-workers are unable (as we shall see below) to restrict the 
scaling operation to remuneration. 
 
Having extracted national means by race (or as some would prefer to say, by population group), a 
process on whose intricacies we reflect a little below, the next step is to compare them with those 
                                                 




extracted from the survey data.  The need for a scaling factor (‘a’) arises because the sum of the product 
of mean wage (W) and aggregate employment (E) for each group derived from surveys, does not equal 
total remuneration (R) (van der Berg et al, 2005, p.28). 
 
Readers may become a little confused about the sources of the survey means that have to be scaled.  This 
is probably because the scaling operation is performed on both Statistics South Africa data (the OHSs 
and LFSs), as well as on the AMPS data.
9  The former are used, inter alia, for tracking changes in 
remuneration, whereas the latter are the backbone of the poverty estimates.  Appendix 1 in the 2005 
paper (pp.27-28), ‘Estimating racial shares of remuneration income and racial trends in employment and 
wages’, (which contains the expression reproduced above), is given over to a description of the process 
by which extraction of information from the Statistics South Africa data takes place. 
 
Appendix 2 in the 2005 paper (pp.29-30) ‘Moving from per capita data to poverty and distribution data’, 
describes how the AMPS data are pummeled into a shape which allows for the making of poverty 
estimates.  Central to this is a scaling process apparently similar to that performed on the Statistics 
South Africa data.  To clear the way for making the poverty estimates, plausible distributions had to be 
constructed.  In their words: 
 
“Only once the distribution curve was obtained, could an estimate of the underlying mean income be 
calculated.  These distributional means were then proportionally adjusted to bring them in line with 
the per capita estimates already calculated.  Put differently, the distribution curve was shifted to be 
compatible with the per capita racial distribution data that we had obtained and anchored on the 
national accounts.” (van der Berg et al, 2005, p.29) 
 
The Statistics South Africa data discussed in Appendix 1 makes it appearance in the 2005 paper to make 
the point that particularly after 2000, African incomes and remuneration (in absolute and relative terms) 
were rising faster than those for whites (2005, p.13), a ‘fact’ used to bolster the conclusion that poverty 
was falling rapidly.  We will return later to their claim about the ‘rise in the black share of employment’.  
As far as the poverty and inequality estimates are concerned, it is the AMPS data discussed in Appendix 
2 that is of relevance. 
 
Let us pause for a moment to reflect on two aspects of the process described above, namely, the 
estimation of mean incomes, by race, at the national level, and the validity (or otherwise) of the scaling 
process. 
 
For national-level estimates of remuneration (R) by race, the data sources used by the authors are spelled 
out in a passage cited above (these include “… national accounts data series, employment data from the 
Standardised Employment Series and Labour Force Surveys, and social grant data from fiscal incidence 
studies”).  A great deal of effort must have gone into uncovering the national means – it would be 
interesting to see how well their estimates stand up to scrutiny.
10 
 
Remuneration data (salaries and wages) by population group, at various SIC levels, from 1-digit (major 
division) downwards, used to be collected and published by Statistics South Africa (when it was still 
called the Central Statistical Service).  Then, in 1985, the mining sector refused to supply remuneration 
figures by population group, possibly because the continuing high differentials would have provided 
                                                 
9 To make matters a little less easy for readers to follow, the 2007a paper (p.20) offers a chart containing AMPS-based 
and IES (Income and Expenditure Surveys)-based poverty counts.  The counts are based on raw (unadjusted) and on 
scaled data (in line with national accounts).  For 2000, the IES gives slightly lower poverty counts on both raw and 
adjusted (scaled) figures. 
10 Furnishing detailed descriptions of the way in which magnitudes such as these national means are estimated, makes 
for tiresome reading (and lengthy papers!).  It may well be the case that most readers do not want to know about the 




ammunition to ‘troublemakers’.  From that point onwards, national estimates of remuneration by race 
could not be presented as they had been in the past (see South African Statistics 1993, p.7.7 and 
pp.7.16-7.17).
11  The source of the remuneration data in Statistics 1993 was the old Survey of Total 
Earnings and Employment (STEE).  Remuneration data published in the labour section in later issues of 
South African Statistics came from its replacement, the more modestly named quarterly Survey of 
Earnings and Employment (SEE), and the Survey of Average Monthly Earnings (AME) – (see, for 
example, South African Statistics 2001, Section 7).  There is no information in the latter publication on 
remuneration by population group, nor is there any in South African Statistics 2003, to which the 
authors refer (see Section 9 of South African Statistics 2003).
12 
 
Depending on one’s purpose, dropping the racial categories was either a blessing or a curse.  All is not 
lost, however, for those who cling to race as a meaningful variable – the SAMs (Social Accounting 
Matrixes) publish remuneration data by race.  Although the most recent SAM could not be, and could 
not have been the source of the van der Berg et al estimates for 2004, it could possibly be used as a 
benchmark.  It could not be the source because it refers to the year 2003 (Report 04-03 (2002)).  It could 
not have been used for the 2005 paper because it only appeared in September 2006.
13  It could, however, 
as suggested above, have been used as a benchmark on their 2003 figures.  Given the critical job that 
racial mean incomes have to do in their work, it would be good to have an inkling of how reliable they 
consider their estimates to be. 
 
As far as the scaling factors used to render survey incomes consistent with national accounts estimates 
are concerned, van der Berg and Louw refer, for example, in their 2003 article, to the criticisms of the: 
 
“… very strong and unlikely assumption that survey underestimation of actual income is 
distribution-neutral, i.e. that the income of the rich and the poor is underestimated to the same 
degree… ” 
 
They continue with the observation that: 
 
“However valid their criticism may be, this leaves no way of dealing with inequality where surveys 
clearly underestimates (sic) incomes (as is the case in South Africa), other than waiting for more 
perfect surveys, because their argument implicitly acknowledges that distributional data from surveys 
cannot be trusted.” (van der Berg and Louw, 2003, p.5) 
 
In short, since (for them) there is no feasible alternative to (a) adjusting incomes equi-proportionally for 
under-reporting, and (b) scaling survey means using national accounts means, an unwillingness to resort 
to both practices would mean giving up the hope of having anything useful to say about poverty and 
inequality.  As far as the last-named of these imperatives is concerned, there is a bit more leeway than is 
implied by the work of van der Berg and his colleagues.  If one drops the not-terribly-meaningful 
concentration on race, and focuses, as I have done on estimates of earnings from employment only, then 
the awkward business of estimating national means (by race), before (b) can be attempted, disappears.  
Around the first of the problems (a), there is at present, no means of navigation.  After engaging in a 
little speculation about the possibilities of simulating different distributions of under-reporting errors, I 
conceded defeat, arguing that: 
 
                                                 
11 The earlier poverty paper by van der Berg and Louw refers to this break in the series (2003, pp.6-7). 
12 The statistical release containing the national accounts (P0441) is now also innocent of any reference to race.  It 
contains only the total remuneration (R) for all races by major division and for the economy as a whole (see, for 
example, P0441, 30 November 2004, pp.64-65, or 28 November 2006, pp.50-51). 
13 As part of the process of making statistics less incoherent, the Labour Accounts for South Africa (LAS), as part of the 





“With no mechanism to guide selection among alternatives, we would flounder in a sea of 
simulations – for better or for worse, it has been decided to stick with the assumption of uniform 
error… ” (Meth, 2006b, p.28) 
 
On that somewhat chastening note, let us rejoin the main stream of the argument by taking a look at the 
definition of income that emerges from the AMPS questionnaire. 
 
Defining income earners the AMPS way 
 
Defining income is relatively straightforward, measuring its magnitude, not so.  The conceptual basis for 
the identification of different forms of income is the ancient economic tradition of identifying the 
returns to (the value added by) the four factors of production, land, labour, capital and entrepreneurship, 
where lands earns rent, labour, a wage, capital receives interest, and entrepreneurs are rewarded with 
profits (or losses!).  In the olden days, after salaries and wages (remuneration) had been deducted from 
value added (GDP at factor incomes), the residual (interest, rent and profits) was lumped together in the 
national accounts under the heading ‘operating surplus’ (see, for example, Statistics South Africa 1993, 
pp.21.10-21.13).  With the passage of the 1993 SNA (System of National Accounts) definitions have 
become more rigorous.  The spirit, however, remains the same.
 14 
 
There is an even older tradition in economics that referred to earned and unearned income – operating 
surplus from whatever source, in this approach, falls into the ‘unearned’ category.  In practice, the 
distinction between earned and unearned income is a bit blurred.  It is conventional to think of 
‘earnings’ as a return to current effort of some sort, most commonly, work.  The fruits of this effort, 
wages and salaries, are commonly referred to as ‘remuneration’.
15  It is only the remuneration 
component of total income which van der Berg et al (2005 and 2007a) set out to scale, i.e., adjust for 
under-reporting (their attempt to do so, as will be seen below, is unsuccessful).  Although investments of 
one sort or another also generate ‘earnings’ – rather obviously, (some) pensions are the ‘earnings’ of 
past saving and investment activity – it is not standard practice to refer to recipients of income from 
investments as ‘income earners’. 
 
As a glance at the AMPS questionnaire reveals (the relevant questions are reproduced in the Appendix at 
the end of this paper), this convention is not adhered to in their survey instrument (or at least it was not 
in 2004).  Questions PD 11 and PD12 are the only sources in the AMPS of information on earnings and 
earners.  For both the respondent and for others who bring income into the household, all sources of 
income except children’s part-time earnings, are treated alike, i.e., as earned income.  Since the AMPS 
questionnaire defines ‘earnings’ in such a way as to include all pensions (and presumably all other 
social grants), it cannot be used to distinguish between workers earning a wage or salary (remuneration), 
as opposed to those ‘earning’ money from other sources.
16  A great deal of effort is devoted by van der 
                                                 
14 The official definitions of the various forms that income can take (forms that is, that are recognised in official 
statistics) are to be found in the SNA (System of National Accounts), the most recent version of which was published 
in 1993 version (and is amended from time to time).  Remuneration (income payable to an employee of an enterprise 
for work done) is defined in paragraph 7.21.  Operating surplus (or mixed income) is defined from paragraphs 7.80 
onwards 
15 Workers in unincorporated enterprises (which range enormously in earning capacity) present difficulties for official 
statistics gatherers because of the problems involved in measuring the costs of the production of their incomes.  Many 
informal economy workers in South Africa fall into this category – accurate measurement of their net earnings is no 
simple task.  Their net incomes must be at least as likely to be under-reported as the earnings of the employed.  In my 
work, whatever correction for under-reporting I make to wages and salaries, applies to the incomes of informal 
economy workers as well. 
16 The exclusion of ‘children’s part-time earnings’ should not deter ‘earners’ from reporting the child support grant as 




Berg and his colleagues to collecting information on social grant income (see, for example, van der Berg 
et al, 2007a, p.17).  Since the AMPS income data apparently includes some or all of the social grant 
income going to the poor, it is not obvious how double-counting is avoided when transfer income (Ti in 
the expression above) comes to be allocated. 
 
The way in which the income questions are posed effectively prevents poverty researchers from gaining 
access to a piece of information that is vital to any poverty study, namely, how many people in the 
household perform paid work, and how much they are paid for doing it.
17  If the survey respondent is the 
only person ‘earning’ an income in the household, and they describe themselves as either working full-
time or part-time, a piece of information that meets this description of ‘vital’ will have been generated.  
In all other cases (multiple earners, respondent not employed), part or all of the nature of the ‘earnings’ 
is indeterminate. 
 
There is no explanation in the papers on poverty by van der Berg and his colleagues, using the AMPS 
data, of how income earners who are remunerated for work done are distinguished from all of the other 
‘earners’ detected by the Questions PD11 and PD12.
18 
 
Tucked away in the bottom corner of AMPS question PD13 is a space for an interviewer estimate of 
personal income, to be filled in if the respondent refuses to supply the relevant information.  That 
(potentially) enables the boast to be made that zero-incomes (a problem that bedevils most survey 
instruments seeking information on income) are not a problem issue in the AMPS surveys.  Such a boast, 
however, does not deserve much attention until (a) the number of refusals is known, and (b) the quality 
of the interviewer’s estimates can be ascertained.  There is no reference in the van der Berg et al (2005) 
paper to this problem.  Unlike the Statistics South Africa surveys of which I have made use (the LFS and 
GHS), the AMPS surveys do not collect estimates of total household consumption.  Expenditure estimates 
are useful not only as a check on income estimates, they also provide a reasonably good basis for simple 
imputation, where income estimates are missing.  Of course, this advantage does not count for much 




Information collected on the age distribution (question PD10) in the AMPS is skimpy.  It is not possible, 
for example, to determine whether anyone else other than the respondent is ‘retired’ (question PD2).  It 
is also not possible to distinguish migrant remittances (an important source of income in workerless 
households) in the AMPS surveys.  By comparison with the AMPS surveys, therefore, the Statistics South 
Africa household surveys (the GHS and LFS) are a model of rectitude, and hence, a potentially more 
reliable source of data on poverty. 
 
                                                 
17 Describing pensioners as ‘earners’ may not be problematic for the ordinary users of the AMPS data (subscribers? 
members of SAARF, the South African Advertising Research Foundation).  The same is not true, however, for poverty 
researchers.  Most pensions in South Africa are transfers (unrequited payments) from the state to individuals who meet 
specific (poverty) criteria. 
18 By contrast, the LFSs and GHSs produced by Statistics South Africa distinguish carefully between income earned 
from employment (remuneration), social grant income, and in the case of the LFS, migrant remittances. 
19 Two papers on the poverty question, of which I am aware, have been published so far this year by the van der Berg 
stable.  The 2007a paper (p.14) refers to the “comprehensive information” on the AMPS available in van der Berg et al 
(2007b).  Turning to that source, one finds about 50 words devoted to the income data in the AMPS surveys.  Here 
they are: 
“… the information on household income, … is collected through showing respondents cue cards divided into 28 or 
more categories (surveys in more recent years include up to 32 income categories). Where a respondent withholds such 
information, SAARF imputes household income on the basis of household expenditure implied by the product 
questionnaire.” (van der Berg et al, 2007b, pp.7-8). 




An indication of the extent of the differences between the van der Berg et al estimates of the extent of 
poverty in South Africa, and those that I have produced, in particular, those in Meth (2006b), was given 
in the introduction of the present paper.  Absolute headcounts, it may be recalled, are lower in van der 
Berg et al (2007a) than they are in their 2005 paper.  At least part of the explanation for the differences 
between our respective results must lie in the distributions extracted from the surveys we use as basic 
data.  Statistics South Africa surveys detect large numbers of workerless households.  Their sole means 
of support is social grants and migrant remittances.  It seems likely, if I have understood the van der 
Berg et al methodology correctly, that because of the sloppy way in which ‘earnings’ are defined in the 
AMPS surveys, there are proportionately too many income earners distributed among the households (it 
may be that the AMPS users are more interested in how much households have to spend, than in how 
the household acquired the income to do so). 
 
It was argued above that using race as a primary variable was not a good idea.  A moment’s reflection 
on the differences between the ‘structures’ of total incomes of the various races or population groups 
makes it clear why this is so.  With their much higher labour absorption rates (65.1 per cent in 
September 2004), a large proportion of white incomes is in the form of remuneration.  Among the 
African population, the proportion of the working age population that is employed is much smaller (34.8 
per cent in September 2004, if subsistence agricultural workers are included, 32.9 per cent if they are 
not). 
 
Africans, by contrast, receive proportionately more income in the form of social grants.  If these 
differences did not exist, then applying a scaling factor to income, loosely defined, would result in the 
same relative error being imposed on each income estimate.  When, however, inter-racial differences 
such as those described above exist, then the scaling is biased – African incomes are raised by too much, 
relative to those of the whites.  Since poverty in South Africa is overwhelmingly suffered by the African 
population, the result of this bias is to understate poverty in that population group. 
 
There is no discussion in the van der Berg et al (2005) paper of this problem, nor is there any discussion 
of the need to reconcile estimates of the numbers of ‘earners incomes’ in the AMPS surveys with 
numbers of remunerated workers (which number, cannot be derived from AMPS surveys).  In other 
words, the differences between our respective estimates probably arises from the existence of ‘income 
earners’ in the AMPS surveys whose income originates in the social grants (and property income), which 
are then scaled along with those of the genuine recipients of remuneration (W * E).  Unless van der Berg 
and his co-authors have access to data collected on the basis of a different AMPS questionnaire for 
2004
20 from that which I downloaded from the SAARF website, one which elicits information on income 
earners in a manner that would allow the problems described above to be overcome, said problems 
constitute an insurmountable barrier to the proper measurement of remuneration (Ri). 
 
Whereas the AMPS surveys that van der Berg et al use probably have too many income ‘earners’, it is 
possible, as I have argued (Meth, 2006b, p.17), that the numbers of workers picked up by the Statistics 
South Africa surveys at the bottom end of the distribution are an understatement of the true 
employment level.  This could happen because the reference period for reporting on work activities is the 
previous seven days.  That this is a significant problem needs, however, to be demonstrated rather than 
merely suggested, as I have done.
21 
 
                                                 
20 For the purposes of the argument presented here, it is not necessary to look at the questionnaires for any other year 
–2004 is a key year in both our analyses – the non-availability of the information required to make a ‘proper’ estimate 
of the extent and severity of poverty in that year would scupper their whole enterprise. 
21 If the LFSs and GHSs under-count the numbers who work (possibly because the reference period for reporting on 
work (the previous seven days), is too short, the surveys could miss people with sporadic employment (say, a few days 
each month).  Neither the impact of this omission, nor that of the poor quality of property income data, on poverty 




Until such time as van der Berg et al offer a more detailed description of the method used to produce 
earned income (remuneration) distribution figures out of the AMPS data, and in particular, of the way in 
which the other problems described above are dealt with (the hallmark of good scholarship is 
replicability), their results cannot be accepted as anything more than an interesting set of speculations. 
 
Changes in shares of remuneration by race 
 
To end this paper, a quibble is raised.  This time it concerns the shares of remuneration (by race) of those 
in formal sector employment.  Poverty, as we all know, is heavily concentrated in the African population 
group.  It does not, however, follow that poverty will fall if the share of total remuneration accruing to 
that groups rises – if it is the income increases of skilled workers that causes African mean and total 
incomes to rise relative to whites, then both the distribution of income and the severity of poverty 
among the African group could worsen.  As noted above, demonstrating that African workers receive an 
increasing share of wage income is part of the argument used by van der Berg and his co-authors to 
draw a picture of generally rising prosperity in that population group.
22  Figure 3 in the 2007a working 
paper depicts: 
 
“… racial shares of income from main job earned in the formal sector, sourced from the OHS and 
LFS series.”  The authors ask us to note the “… steadily increasing black share of remuneration, 




To draw this conclusion, data on earnings and employment are required.  The source for the latter is 
given as the Labour Force Surveys (van der Berg et al, 2005, Figure 2, p.31).  Since the surveys under-
report earned incomes, some method of adjustment for this problem, has to be devised. 
 
Inconsistencies in the LFS series 
 
Although the authors do not draw attention to it, the fact is that the LFSs are difficult sources to 
negotiate.  Prior to 2005, a number of discontinuities existed in the LFS employment, unemployment 
and working age population (WAP) series.  The reasons, the details of which do not much concern us 
here, had to do with the fact that the ‘old’ series under-estimated the size of the working age population 
(26.894 million instead of 27.807 million in September 2000).  Those among us who were interested in 
the LFSs, were aware that a revised (reweighted) set of estimates was due to be released by Statistics 
South Africa – we waited for it with bated breath, suspecting that some or all of what we had concluded 
on the basis of the discontinuity-ridden series, could be overturned.  Finally, in 2005, the revised set of 
estimates of some of the most important variables with the discontinuities removed (by benchmarking 
                                                 
22 In their 2005 paper, van der Berg et al report a substantial increase in inequality in the African population between 
1993 and 2000.  Between 2000 and 2004, it is said to fall slightly.  Among the four population groups they identify, 
inequality among Africans is by far the highest (2005, Fig 15, p.38).  The 2007a paper repeats this story in more detail 
(the 1993 Gini for Africans was 0.547 – by 2000 it had risen to 0.609, only to drop to 0.598 by 2004.  Corresponding 
Theil indexes for those years were 0.584; 0.764 and 0.740.  The Gini coefficient for the population group with next 
most unequal distribution of income in 2004, Coloureds, was 0.550 (van der Berg et al, 2007a, Table 3, p.22).  
Incidentally, although it is customary to present inequality measures to three decimal places (poverty measures are also 
sometimes reported thus), such ‘precision’ (in which most of us indulge at times) is almost certainly spurious – it is 
unlikely that the fragile data on which such figures are based could support such claims. 
23 A similar sentiment was expressed in the earlier paper, which referred to: 
“… steadily increasing black share of remuneration, which comes predominantly at the expense of the shrinking white 
share.” (2005, p.13).  The relevant chart is numbered Figure 10 (2005, p.35) where the variable was described as 




the whole series to the 2001 census) was published.  Tables of employment by sector (Formal and 
informal) and main industry by sex (Tables 4.4.1; 4.4.2 and 4.4.3) are given.  No tables of employment 
by sector by industry by population group were published, although these could be estimated using the 
revised weights that could be obtained on application from Stats SA. 
 
The original paper on this topic (van der Berg et al, 2005), of which the 2007a paper is a follow-up, was 
published on 30
th September 2005.  The revised LFS figures were embargoed for publication until 26
th 
September 2005.  It is not possible, therefore, for van der Berg and his colleagues to have made use of 
the revised LFS figures in their original paper.  For the 2000 estimates, they would have had to use the 
forerunner of the ‘official’ statistics now published in the LFSs.  Released on 26
th June 2001, the 
September 2000 labour force survey results was described by Statistics South Africa as ‘Discussion paper 
1’, this being the designation of a set of figures that have not yet been accorded ‘official statistics’ 
status.  The September 2004 LFS results, by contrast, which were published on 31 March 2005, and 
which have not had to be revised or reweighted, would have been available to van der Berg and his 
colleagues at the time of writing the 2005 paper.  As may be seen in Table 1 below, the revisions to the 
LFS estimates for 2000 were substantial. 
 
 
    Table 1  Formal sector employment, 2000-2004 
 African  Coloured  Indian  White  Total 
Sept 2000, Original  4328  1038  376  1744  7509 
% Share of employment  57.6 13.8 5.0  23.2  100.0 
Sept 2000, Revised  4620  1027  363  1905  7932 
% Share of employment  58.2 13.0 4.6  24.0  100.0 
September  2004  4894  1111  382 1910 8318 
% Share of employment  58.8 13.4 4.6  23.0  100.0 
        
Increase - 2000 Original – 
2004  566  73  6 166 809 
Increase - 2000 Revised – 2004  274  84  19  5  386 
        
% change 2000 Original – 
2004  13.1  7.0 1.6 9.5  10.8 
% change 2000 Revised - 2004  5.9  8.1  5.2  0.3  4.9 
Source: 2000 Original:  Statistics South Africa 2001 
2000 Revised: Statistics South Africa website, Interactive data site 
2004: P0210, 31 March 2005. 
Note: Employment and changes in the numbers employed are in 1000s. 
 
 
Although the authors must have been aware, at the time of writing the 2005 paper, that the use of the 
unrevised numbers could be problematic, there is no reference in that paper to the issue.  Less forgivably, 
there is no mention of it in the 2007a paper. 
 
Using the original figures for the year 2000, employment appeared to have increased by about 800 000 
between that year and 2004.  The number of Africans employed in the formal sector reportedly increased 
by 566 000.  Employment of whites was also said to have increased substantially.  The revised estimates 




is quite possible that such job growth as was reported, occurred mainly in high-skilled jobs.
24  This would 
represent a gain for the burgeoning black middle-class, a phenomenon to which van der Berg et al make 
frequent reference.  It would, however, do but little for the poor. 
 
The claim that formal-sector remuneration for Africans was rising faster than that for whites, if true, is 
mildly interesting.  Not all of the evidence, however, supports the generally upbeat report of conditions 
among Africans produced by van der Berg et al.  Absorption rates, for example, (the number employed 
divided by working age population) for whites, are roughly constant (at about 65 per cent) over the 
period 2000-2004.  The number of whites employed falls – so does the size of the working age 
population, and by a slightly larger proportion – the (slight upward) change in the absorption rate is 
probably not statistically significant.  For Africans, the question of how to treat subsistence agricultural 
activities for purposes of measuring employment, has, as we have seen above, a significant impact on 
the absorption rate.  If one includes those performing such activities, the absorption rate falls 
dramatically between 2000-2004 (from 39.4 to 34.8 per cent).  If one excludes them, the fall is 
moderated (from 34.4 to 32.9 per cent).
25  Either way, the decline in the rate sits rather awkwardly with 
the relatively optimistic findings on the welfare of the African population group reported by van der 
Berg et al. 
 
In addressing the question of changes in the racial shares of income, the same problem that makes the 
measurement of income poverty such an uphill struggle, namely, the extent and distribution of under-
reporting errors by income class, or by race, or whatever other differentiation is used, presents itself.  
Even if it were possible to extract a reliable set of employment figures from the LFSs for September 2000 
and September 2004, figures which provided estimates of the distribution of jobs by occupation or 
sector, by race, one would still be faced with the problem of trying to discover their incomes. 
 
Since the extent of under-reporting of income in different years, by income category or by decile, or by 
race, or whatever other sub-division of the workers one dreams up, cannot be ascertained, one can only 
place one’s trust, as the authors do with the AMPS data, in the distributions that emerge from the LFS 
data, and then scale the survey means using national accounts means.  The inability to get around the 
problem of possible (probable?) differential under-reporting, 
26 suggests that rather than making 
confident assertions about changes in the racial shares of remuneration, a little modesty is called for.  
We cannot be sure what the situation was when the original 2000 LFS estimates (i.e., the LFS results as-
published in 2001) were compared with the 2004 figures.  Because we cannot determine under-reporting 
at any level of disaggregation, shifting to the revised 2000 LFS estimates leaves us no wiser.  Cautious 




At a time when the debate over the success of anti-poverty policy, and the likelihood of the ‘social 
objective’ of halving poverty (spelled out in the Asgisa document, 2006), is hotting up, incorrect 
                                                 
24 The LFSs collect data on occupations and incomes (and race), so it is notionally possible to measure the changes 
that took place between 2000 and 2004.  Whether the surveys are sufficiently reliable to justify the effort involved is a 
moot point.  For what it is worth, I concluded that job growth between 2001 and 2004 appears to have benefited 
mainly those in the upper income groups.  See Meth (2006b, pp.47-48).  This, I noted, was consistent with the story 
about a growing middle class told by van der Berg et al (2005, p.19). 
25 In Meth (2007c) I argue that as far as subsistence agricultural workers are concerned, estimates of their numbers are 
not only barely credible, but the behaviour of the series is occasionally so erratic, that they should be excluded from 
estimates of changes in total employment.  Subsistence agricultural obviously cannot be ignored.  The problems 
involved in measuring this activity are so severe, that they require special treatment. 
26 As noted above, van der Berg and his co-authors have long been aware of this problem, and the absence of any 




measurement of both the current severity of poverty, and of the impact on poverty that the economic 
growth of the past few years, and the rapid expansion of particularly the numbers of child support 
grants dispensed, has had, could have severe consequences for the poor.  Misplaced satisfaction (on the 
part of government) with the form that policy has taken up until now, could see a worsening of the 
already dire conditions of many millions of people. 
 
Poverty estimates produced by van der Berg et al (2005: 2007a) have found great favour with 
government in recent times because of the apparently substantial progress in the struggle against 
poverty that they report.  My estimates of poverty for roughly the same period are altogether more 
pessimistic (Meth, 2006b).  The present paper looks into the reasons for the large differences between our 
respective poverty estimates. 
 
Other than to hint at a possible explanation for the void between our estimates, my earlier work on 
poverty did not venture too deeply into the terrain occupied by van der Berg and his colleagues.  Their 
most recent estimates, however, push the headcount for the year 2004 a further two million below the 
15.4 million they found in the 2005 paper (my estimate for that year was about 18 million).  A difference 
of almost five million is too much to ignore.  Accordingly, the present paper works its way through the 
various presentations of their methodology, finally coming to land on the AMPS questionnaire which 
furnishes the raw data for the survey distributions (by race), whose values they scale upwards, until the 
means equal those extracted from the national accounts. 
 
If my reading of the AMPS questionnaire is correct, the difference in our findings is largely to be 
explained by the poor quality (for poverty measurement purposes) of the income questions in the 
questionnaire.  With few exceptions, anyone bringing income into a household is treated by the AMPS 
survey as an ‘income earner’.  As such, all of their mean incomes are apparently scaled upwards to 
eradicate the effect of under-reporting of income in the surveys.  This, I argue, is inappropriate – the 
only incomes that should be scaled are those that represent a return to current effort (primarily wages 
and salaries).  (And since we cannot know the extent of under-reporting by income class, or race, all 
such scalings represent a leap in the dark, one which I too, have been forced to make). 
 
The AMPS definition of ‘earned income’ appears to include social grants (the big three being state old 
age pensions, disability grants and child support grants).  Given the massive differences in labour 
absorption rates, and the major differences in the composition of income of the different race groups, the 
use by van der Berg et al of race as an organising category is argued to lead to an understatement of the 
extent and severity of poverty.  The contribution of social grants to total household income is 
proportionately greater in African than in white households (among which group the labour absorption 
rate is twice as high as it is among African households).  Since the value of social grants is known, their 
contribution to total income in any household reporting receipt of a social grant can, in principle, be 
determined with precision.  That the Statistics South Africa household surveys do a less-than-perfect job 
of detecting the grant-receiving households in no way detracts from the serious error involved in taking 
no account at all of the source of income when the scaling process (as carried out by van der Berg et al) 
takes place.  In short, it is their apparent failure to scale only incomes earned from employment 
(remuneration) that seems to account for the differences between our results. 
 
The paper ends with a brief discussion of the difficulties of estimating racial shares of remuneration.  
Both employment and earnings are hard to estimate accurately, especially in an era when the main 
source of data, the Labour Force Surveys, was undergoing development.  In a splendid essay, Joan 
Robinson refers to utility as “a metaphysical concept of impregnable circularity” (1981, p.48).  While the 
work of van der Berg and his co-authors on poverty has not yet attained the dizzying heights of that of 
the neo-classical metaphysicians, there are elements of tail-chasing in it which suggest they are heading 
in that direction.  Applying what is, by their own admission, a dubious technique to shaky data, they 




another data-set also known to be fraught with errors of under-reporting of unknown magnitude and 
distribution, and then use the outcome (racial shares of remuneration are moving in favour of the 
African population group) to support the first conclusion.  This will not do.  It is a pity that they do not 
abandon the search for the key to the scaling mystery, and stick instead to refining the results they 
reproduce in Figure 5 of their 2007a paper (see p.20).  In that chart, the unadjusted AMPS figures 
suggest strongly that poverty is declining after 2000.  If they can confirm this by solving the problems 
with the AMPS income data discussed above, they would then have earned the right to describe their 
work as unique.  Disagreement over the extent of the fall in poverty will not disappear, but that issue, if 
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Appendix:  Extract from AMPS 2004 Questionnaire 
 










PD10. How many people, excluding domestic workers and household helpers, but including yourself, are there in 
each of the following groups, currently living in this household? 
 
Males   Females 
Under 12 months 
12 - 23 months 
24 - 35 months 
 
3 - 6 years 
7 - 9 years 
10 - 11 years 
 
12 years 
13 - 14 years 
15 years 
 
16 - 34 years 
35 + years 
 
PD11. How many people in your household earn money?  Please INCLUDE those who have an income from 
pensions and investments, but EXCLUDE children's part-time earnings. 
 
PD12. Please give me the letter which best describes the TOTAL MONTHLY HOUSEHOLD INCOME of all these 
people before tax and other deductions.  Please include all sources of income i.e. salaries, pensions, income from 





PD13. Please give me the letter which best describes your PERSONAL TOTAL MONTHLY INCOME before tax and 
other deductions.  Please include all sources of income i.e. salaries, pensions, income from investments, etc. 
 
A  R 1  -  R 199 
B  R 200  -  R 299 
C  R 300  -  R 399 
D  R 400  -  R 499 
E  R 500  -  R 599 
F  R 600  -  R 699 
G  R 700  -  R 799 
H  R 800  -  R 899 
I  R 900  -  R 999 
J  R 1 000  -  R 1 099 
K  R 1 100  -  R 1 199 
L  R 1 200  -  R 1 399 
M  R 1 400  -  R 1 599 
N  R 1 600  -  R 1 999 
O  R 2 000  -  R 2 499 
P  R 2 500  -  R 2 999 
Q  R 3 000  -  R 3 999 
R  R 4 000  -  R 4 999 
S  R 5 000  -  R 5 999 
T  R 6 000  -  R 6 999 
U  R 7 000  -  R 7 999 
V  R 8 000  -  R 8 999 











































000 +   
● No personal income (PD13) 
REFUSED      INTERVIEWER  ESTIMATE  (PD12) 
 





 The Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit
The Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit (SALDRU) conducts re-
search directed at improving the well-being of South Africa’s poor. It was established 
in 1975. Over the next two decades the unit’s research played a central role in docu-
menting the human costs of apartheid. Key projects from this period included the Farm 
Labour Conference (1976), the Economics of Health Care Conference (1978), and the Sec-
ond Carnegie Enquiry into Poverty and Development in South Africa (1983-86). At the 
urging of the African National Congress, from 1992-1994 SALDRU and the World Bank 
coordinated the Project for Statistics on Living Standards and Development (PSLSD). 
This project provide baseline data for the implementation of post-apartheid socio-eco-
nomic policies through South Africa’s ﬁ  rst non-racial national sample survey. 
 
In the post-apartheid period, SALDRU has continued to gather data and conduct research 
directed at informing and assessing anti-poverty policy.   In line with its historical con-
tribution, SALDRU’s researchers continue to conduct research detailing changing pat-
terns of well-being in South Africa and assessing the impact of government policy on 
the poor.  Current research work falls into the following research themes:  post-apart-
heid poverty; employment and migration dynamics; family support structures in an era 
of rapid social change; public works and public infrastructure programmes, ﬁ  nancial 
strategies of the poor; common property resources and the poor.  Key survey projects 
include the Langeberg Integrated Family Survey (1999), the Khayelitsha/Mitchell’s Plain 
Survey (2000), the ongoing Cape Area Panel Study (2001-) and the Financial Diaries 
Project. 
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School of Economics
University of Cape Town
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Cape Town, South Africa
Tel: +27 (0) 21 650 5696
Fax: +27 (0) 21 650 5697
Email: brenda.adams@.uct.ac.za
Web: www.saldru.uct.ac.za
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